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Religion, Faith-Based Community Organizing, and the Struggle for Justice
Cambridge Handbook of the Sociology of Religion
Cambridge University Press, 2003
Richard L. Wood1
University of New Mexico
On May 2, 2000, three thousand people converged on the State Capitol in Sacramento,
California.2 But this was not the usual frenzy of lobbyists serving the interests of the well-off,
using the tools of well-oiled political action committees. Rather, these were working poor,
working class, and lower-middle income people lately referred to as “working families” and they
went to Sacramento because they were tired of living on the verge of financial ruin or physical
debility. Attendees were demanding adequate health coverage for people left out by current
health care arrangements and they were angry about that, at a time when remarkable wealth was
being accumulated all around them and California was running a $10 billion budget surplus.
The occasion was an “action” entitled “Healthcare for All Californians: Reweaving the
Fabric of American Communities,” sponsored by the Pacific Institute for Community
Organization (PICO). The day’s event drew on recent academic research showing 1.5 million
California children formally eligible for subsidized health coverage but still uninsured due to
onerous inscription procedures, and a total of 7.3 million Californians uninsured, most relying on
community clinics or emergency rooms for their medical care. The same research showed 82%
of the uninsured to be members of working families, with nearly half headed by a family
member working full-time for all of 1999.3
They packed the hall with a crowd approximately 40% Latino, 40% white, and 20%
African American and Hmong. And they were loud: they believed they had to be to turn around
a state government that had so far rejected any solution that might be labeled an “entitlement” to
medical care. More than a few leading California politicians and political aides reportedly did
double-takes as they entered the largest and most multiracial political gathering in Sacramento in
years.
The event began with a reading from the book of Amos, the Hebrew prophet who
denounced an earlier time when the wealthy violated Yahweh’s covenant by turning their backs
on the poor:
I hate, I despise your feasts
I take no pleasure in your solemn festivals.
When you offer me holocausts and grain offerings
I will not accept them...
Take away from me the noise of your songs;
I will not listen to the melody of your harps.
But let justice roll down like waters,
and righteousness like an overflowing stream.4
Amos 5:21-24
The event continued with a prayer by a San Francisco pastor, Bill Knezovich:
Holy God, be here with us. At the beginning of our work, send upon us the spirit
of Amos, so that we may go forward knowing that change will only be done by
ourselves, advocating for our families and for all those not here with us. Hold
before us all those old people forced to choose between food and medicine; all
those couples ruined by medical diseases; all our own children whose health is
neglected because we cannot afford to pay for medicine. Hold them before us so
that we might fight with a righteous anger, as Amos did.
There was much more: testimony by a woman traumatized by her husband’s suicide: he
preferred to kill himself rather than ruin his family financially through a long illness. There were
reports in English, Spanish, and Hmong from families suffering the gnawing anxiety of living
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without medical coverage. There were demands that part of California’s surplus be used to
alleviate the health care crisis, a specific proposal to better fund community health clinics, and
talk of a legislative bill to expand the “Healthy Families” medical insurance program in
California.
A series of state political figures were then asked to commit themselves to work with
PICO on this agenda. Among others, the President Pro-Tempore of the California Senate, John
Burton, stepped to the microphone saying, “First of all, I’m overwhelmed at this magnificent
turnout.” He then committed himself to working with PICO to expand health coverage in
California for the working poor.
More followed, but the flavor of the evening is perhaps best captured by two quotations.
The first was a phrase reiterated by a number of PICO leaders from around the state: “Healthcare
now, for all God’s people! Alleluia! Amen.” The other was invoked repeatedly by PICO leader
Cesar Portillo, an immigrant from Mexico. Responding to the political mantra of “no new
entitlements” common in American politics today, at various points in the evening Portillo called
out “Se puede?” (Spanish for “Can it be done?”), to which the crowd thundered back, “Sí, se
puede!”
Ultimately, through many ups and downs, political wins and political crises, this event reshaped California public policy on healthcare (see Wood forthcoming for a full analysis). Within
two months, the state approved $50 million dollars in new funding for the primary care clinics
serving poor Californians. More substantial progress came six months later, after sustained
pressure from PICO’s religiously-based leaders from working-class communities around the
state: The state expanded access to the “Healthy Families” program, which previously only
covered health care for children, to include some 300,000 working parents earning up to double
the federal poverty level (about $32,000/year for a family of four). Healthy Families inscription
procedures were also eased in an effort to draw in more California children eligible but
uninsured.
Overview:
These developments in California are crucial for the health and peace of mind of
hundreds of thousands of working families, but are important also as one indicator of a much
broader phenomenon: Religion has re-emerged in both popular understanding and scholarly
analysis as a crucial influence on political dynamics in societies around the world. Much of this
attention has focused on either putatively irrational religious influence (e.g. terrorism associated
with some strains of non-orthodox Islamic fundamentalism; see Taheri 1987; O'Ballance 1997);
religiously-based political activity regarding personal moral behavior (e.g. the “Christian Right”
in the United States; see Wald 1987; Reed 1996); or the impact of religious cleavages on voting
patterns (Manza and Brooks 1999).
This chapter draws attention to a different facet of religiously-based efforts to shape
political dynamics: Religiously-based advocacy to promote greater economic justice for lowincome sectors of society. Such efforts are certainly not new: the Exodus story of the ancient
Hebrews’ flight from slavery in Egypt has provided the inspiration and cultural pattern for
struggles for justice for centuries (Walzer 1965); the early popular struggle against enclosure in
England drew vigorously from biblical understandings of justice (Hill 1972); the 19th century
American labor movement and struggle against slavery drew crucial support from religion (Voss
1993); and, in the 1950s and 1960s, religious institutions provided the key organizational and
recruitment vehicles for the black civil rights movement in the United States (Morris 1984). But
three factors justify renewed attention to the religiously-based struggle for economic justice:
First, we now have greater comparative perspective regarding such efforts due to their recent
salience in societies around the world; this makes religiously-based movements for justice
appear less a case of “American exceptionalism” and more as a common social phenomenon.
Second, emerging scholarly work has developed new insight into the internal dynamics of these
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efforts, how and why they succeed or fail, and why they may be important in shaping democratic
life. Third, new systematic data provides the most complete view yet of one influential version of
these efforts, the “faith-based organizing model” that has gained prominence in the United States
and Great Britain over the last two decades, exemplified in the PICO event described above.
After first describing the diverse array of religiously-rooted struggles for economic justice
around the world, this chapter outlines the contours of faith-based organizing in the U.S. (from
where the only systematic data are available), then discusses recent insight into the importance
of faith-based organizing for American democracy. It concludes with a brief discussion of the
role of religion in struggles for justice more generally.
Faith-Based Struggles for Justice Around the World
In Britain, faith-based organizing has taken root in working-class areas of London and
other major cities (Farnell 1994; Warren 2000). British faith-based organizing work draws partly
on indigenous sources for theological, scriptural, and political inspiration (see, for example,
MacLeod (1993), written by an Anglican pastor; and Sacks (1997), written by a British chief
rabbi], and partly on sources borrowed from American faith-based organizing.
In Latin America, community organizing based on religious faith continues to occur in
the comunidades eclesiales de base movement (usually translated “base Christian
communities”). This movement developed in the 1960s and 1970s out of the re-emphasis on the
social dimension of Christianity as Catholic leaders implemented the church reforms of the
Second Vatican Council in the context of Latin America’s vast social inequality (Marins,
Trevisan et al. 1976; Marins, Trevisan et al. 1989; Hewitt 1991; Smith 1991). Although a
continent-wide movement, it took deepest root in Brazil, Central America, Peru, some parts of
Mexico, and Chile prior to the 1973 military coup there. These groups formed initially as bible
study and social reflection groups, partly as a response by Catholic leaders to the challenge
presented by proselytism by evangelical groups. But under the influence of pedagogical models
for political consciousness-raising (conscientizâo) developed by the Brazilian educational
theorist Paolo Freire (1970), and under the pressure of rising economic inequality and political
repression in many countries, the communidades rapidly became centers of radical social critique
and democratic action. Following military governments in the 1960s and 1970s, they contributed
both to the re-democratization of much of Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and to the rise
of guerrilla insurgencies in some countries (Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Mexico). Both
the concrete experience of these comunidades and their theoretical elaboration in the associated
“theology of liberation” (Gutiérrez 1973; Sobrino 1978; Tamez 1982; Sobrino 1984; Tamez
1989; Tamez 1990) have been significant influences upon religious movements around the
world, including upon faith-based organizing in the United States.
Likewise, evangelical social activism in Latin America has at times been a source of
pressure for social justice. Evangelicals have focused primarily on individual moral reform; such
issues such as alcoholism, marital infidelity, and gang involvement have been more typical
concerns in evangelical Latin American networks than have human rights, democratization, or
union struggles. But that has not always been the case. Evangelical scholars in Latin America
(Pixley 1986; Pixley and Azevedo 1988; Pixley and Boff 1989) have written important
scriptural, historical, and theological works emphasizing the centrality of prophetic denunciation
of social injustice in the biblical tradition. David Stoll (1990) argues convincingly that, even
where evangelicals have not focused intentionally on social issues, the unintended political
consequences of mass evangelical mobilization may actually foster democratization at least as
successfully as the more direct demands for radical reform associated with liberationist
Christianity.
In South Africa, the Philippines, and Korea, democratic activists closely linked to
Christian churches have elaborated scriptural, theological, and doctrinal positions arguing for
deep political reform in those societies as the only appropriate response to the demands of the
Christian faith. The best known of these statements was the “Kairos Document” issued by
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Protestant and Catholic clergy and lay leaders in South Africa in 1986, arguing that apartheid
fundamentally and irrevocably contradicted the central tenets of Christianity, calling the
churches to repentance for their collusion in apartheid over the years, and demanding immediate
action to end that collusion (Kairos Theologians 1986; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). In the
Philippines, the “theology of struggle” elaborates a position similar to that of liberation theology
in Latin America, but reflective of the particular political situation and political culture of that
country (Fernandez 1994). In Korea, “Minjung theology” stakes out a similar role for
Christianity, advancing an argument for democratization on the basis of “the people” as the
subject of history – “subject” here meaning the active historical agent pushing society forward
(Kim 1981; Park 1985; Suh 1987; Kwon 1990).
In a similar vein, religious leaders and theologians working within the Christian, Islamic,
and Hindu traditions in Indonesia, India, and Sri Lanka have developed extensive statements on
the religious vocation in the struggle for social justice in their societies (Yeow, England et al.
1989; Sugden 1997). And various strands of Buddhism have underlain resistance to American
involvement in Vietnam, as well as subsequent peace movements in the United States (Nhat
Hanh 1967; Nhat Hanh 1987; Nhat Hanh 1998) and the Tibetan struggle against Chinese
occupation (Levenson 1988; Bstan-'dzin-rgya 1990; Bstan-dzin-rgya and Thupten 1996; FarrarHalls 1998).
Faith-based Community Organizing in the United States:
In the United States, the term “community organizing” typically describes work inspired
or influenced by the dean of community organizers in the United States, Saul Alinsky.5 Alinsky’s
work spanned four decades and deeply shaped subsequent grassroots democratic action
throughout urban America. The faith-based organizing work described here, also known as
“broad-based,” "church-based," or "congregation-based" community organizing, incorporates
techniques promulgated by Alinsky but transcends his legacy in important ways.
Faith-based organizing roots itself institutionally in urban religious congregations, and
culturally in the diverse religious practices and world views of participants – their religious
culture. Such efforts occur in organizations linked to multiple religious congregations, but
autonomous from any single congregation or denomination, and incorporated separately as tax
exempt, non-partisan organizations [typically as 501c(3) organizations under the IRS code].6
Faith-based organizing remains rather unknown in academic circles, but today arguably
represents the most widespread movement for social justice in America, as documented in a new
study (Warren and Wood 2001).7 With about 133 local or metropolitan-area federations linking
some 3,500 congregations plus some 500 public schools, labor union locals, and other
institutions (neighborhood associations, social service agencies, community centers, etc), faithbased organizing can plausibly claim to touch the lives of more than two million members of
religious congregations in all the major urban areas and many secondary cities around the U.S.8
These federations operate in 33 states and the District of Columbia, with strong concentrations in
California, Texas, New York, Illinois, and Florida. Their mean income is $170,500 per year.
Almost 90% of these organizations are affiliated with one of four major faith-based organizing
networks.9
Although each federation carries a distinctive organizational emphasis that colors its
work and reflects the institutional influence of a particular network, all adopt a similar
organizing model. Each federation organizes in a particular city or metropolitan area via
interfaith teams of leaders from 10 to 60 or more religious congregations – and sometimes public
schools, neighborhood associations, or union locals – to do research on a given issue and
negotiate with political and economic elites. They gain a place at that negotiating table by
mobilizing 1,000 to 6,000 participants in non-partisan political actions at which political or
corporate officials are asked to commit to specific policies outlined by the federation, or to work
with the federation in developing a policy response to a given issue. In this way, the strongest of
these metropolitan federations have re-shaped government policy on housing, economic
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development, public schools, policing, working-class wages, recreational program for youth,
medical coverage, and other issues. In some places federations throughout a state or region have
jointly influenced state policy on high-profile issues. For example, in the 1990s, the Texas IAF
Network led the transformation of Texas public education through the Alliance Schools project –
arguably, one of the key innovations that strengthened public schooling in Texas, for which thenGovernor George W. Bush much later claimed credit (Warren 2001). As depicted above, in 2000
the PICO California Project was the central force in transforming health care policy in the most
populous American state, extending government-sponsored medical coverage to hundreds of
thousands of low-income parents.10 Regional or statewide initiatives have also occurred in New
England, Illinois, Louisiana, Minnesota, Florida, Arizona, Colorado, and New Mexico. Taken
together, such efforts have arguably produced the most widespread demands for social justice
arising from within American civil society in recent years, and the most substantial gains for
low-income Americans not arising directly from government policy during the Clinton
presidency, with its very mixed legacy of increased social spending, strong economic growth,
welfare reform, and economic re-structuring.
Also noteworthy is the remarkably cross-racial character of this work. Though the ethnic
and racial make-up of these organizations varies considerably across different geographic
regions, and though some are rather homogeneous, they are diverse even in their homogeneity:
some organizations are almost exclusively African-American, others almost exclusively Latino,
and still others almost exclusively European-American. Elsewhere, they are quite multiracial,
with some federations strongly biracial and others having memberships evenly split between
these same three ethnic groups, with smaller numbers of Filipino, Hmong, Caribbean, and Asian
immigrant or Asian American participants. No national data currently exist regarding individuallevel participation in faith-based organizing, but the same study (Warren and Wood 2001)
assessed the ethnic make-up of the congregations who sponsor it: Approximately 33% of the
congregations are majority African American, 38% are majority white/European, and 20% are
majority Latino (both native and immigrant). The remaining 9% are mostly congregations in
which no one ethnic group makes up the majority, plus a small number of ethnic Asian, Pacific
Islander, Native American, and other groups. Table 1 summarizes the race/ethnic and religious
make-up of the sponsoring congregations:
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Table 1:
Racial Make-up of Congregations Sponsoring Faith-Based Organizing
Racial/Ethnic Diversity
(majority ethnicity of congregations)
38% white/European American
33% African American
20% Hispanic
(includes native-born and immigrant)
9% Other
(mostly interracial; less than 2% majority
Asian, Pacific Islander, Native American)

Table 2:
Religious Make-Up of Congregations Sponsoring Faith-Based Organizing
Religious Diversity
(denomination of congregations)
35% Roman Catholic
34% moderate/liberal Protestant
13% Baptist
(mostly National, Missionary, and
Primitive Baptists, thus mostly African
American)
5% historic black Protestant
3% traditionalist Protestant
2% Jewish
2% Church of God in Christ
(Pentecostal, mostly African-American)
2% Unitarian-Universalist
3% Other Christian
< 1% Other non-Christian
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As Table 2 shows, faith-based organizing also exhibits a fair degree of religious
diversity. Nationally, some 35% of the congregations engaged in faith-based community
organizing are Roman Catholic, 34% are members of denominations usually labeled liberal or
moderate Protestant (mostly United Methodists, Lutherans, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and
United Church of Christ), 5% are affiliated with the historic black church denominations
(African Methodist Episcopal, AME-Zion, Christian Methodist Episcopal), 13% are Baptist
congregations (mostly National Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Missionary Baptist, and independent
Baptists – i.e. mostly black Baptists), 3% are unspecified or non-denominational Christian
congregations, 3% are traditionalist Protestants, 2% are Unitarian-Universalist congregations,
2% are black Pentecostal congregations affiliated with the Church of God in Christ, and a little
less than 2% are Jewish congregations.
Thus, faith-based organizing is primarily based in Roman Catholic, liberal and moderate
Protestant, and African American religious traditions, with some representation from other
faiths. Quite noteworthy is the scarcity of traditionalist or conservative Protestant congregations
(including Southern Baptists), who make up nearly a third of religious congregations in the
United States today.11 Congregations from outside the broad Judeo-Christian tradition, including
Mormon, Islamic, Buddhist, and Hindu congregations, are present within faith-based organizing,
but only minimally.
This particular mix of denominations appears to result from several factors. First, among
Christian denominations, they are the denominations most likely to have congregations located
in core urban areas, which have faced serious socio-economic challenges in recent years and are
the “home turf” of much faith-based organizing. Second, the Catholic bishops’ “Catholic
Campaign for Human Development” (formerly CHD) has made funding for faith-based
organizing a top priority for over 25 years; more recently, mainline Protestant and Jewish
funding agencies have also funded this field extensively. Third, the African American, liberal
and moderate Protestant, and Catholic (as well as the Jewish and Unitarian) theological, ethical,
and scriptural traditions have included this-worldly socio-economic concerns within their core
teachings for many years; this has led these traditions into involvement in social justice issues of
many kinds, including faith-based organizing. The relative absence of traditionalist Protestant
involvement – despite the extensive presence of these groups in the American religious
landscape – appears to result from their stronger emphasis on issues of personal morality and
their discomfort within the cultural milieu of faith-based organizing, which they have often
experienced as predominantly Catholic/liberal Protestant. Finally, in some cases – most notably
that of suburban Southern Baptists – traditionalist Protestant congregations are made up of more
affluent members than the typical congregation involved in faith-based organizing, but this is by
no means the case for all traditional Protestants.
In addition to the particular efforts represented by faith-based organizing, a wide array of
social justice organizing projects in the U.S. are based in or include linkages to faith
communities. Historically, the paradigmatic example of such efforts is the massive movement for
the civil rights of African Americans in the 1950s and 1960s, which can only be understood in
relation to the institutional strength of the black church in the American South (McAdam 1982;
Morris 1984). More contemporary examples include: (1) initiatives around particular social
justice issues within a single religious denomination (anti-racist work within the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America; the promotion of women’s ordination within the Roman Catholic
Church (Dillon 1999); efforts in a variety of denominations to reduce discrimination against gays
and lesbians in American society; advocacy by the Catholic bishops in favor of an “option for
the poor,” “living wage” legislation, and workers’ rights (Coleman 1991); (2) secular issuefocused movements with substantial ties to faith communities (affordable housing, immigrant
rights groups, peace groups, efforts to protect the environment and/or fight “environmental
racism,” human rights work, efforts to promote business ethics and corporate accountability,
etc.); and (3) substantial efforts by segments of the labor movement to build support in local
communities, often through religious congregations (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1995;
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Bronfenbrenner 1998; Rose 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000; see also the AFL-CIO statement at
www.aflcio.org/unioncity). Due to the size, scale, resources, and political capacity of the labor
movement, the latter outreach efforts may be particularly important. Though this essay focuses
on the specific model of faith-based community organizing discussed above, these wider efforts
form a crucial part of religious believers’ efforts to promote social justice in America.
Democratic Implications of Faith-Based Community Organizing:
The sheer scale and political efficacy of faith-based organizing suggest that it may have
important implications for democratic life in the United States in the years ahead. But scale,
efficacy, and even democratic intentions do not guarantee that a movement will foster
democratic life. Historically, some large scale, effective, and avowedly democratic movements
have fostered democracy (e.g. the women’s suffrage and abolitionist movements in the U.S.; the
anti-apartheid movement in South Africa; movements for Irish independence and democracy in
Eastern Europe; the FMLN guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador), while others have been
obstacles to it or ultimately fostered tyranny (e.g. the Russian Bolshevik movement; some of the
anti-colonial and national liberation movements in Africa; the movement for Hutu rights in
Rwanda; Sendero Luminoso in Peru). Assessing the democratic potential of this movement, then,
requires going beyond descriptive work to look more analytically at its possible democratic
implications. Six areas of recent scholarly analysis are important in this regard:
First, recent work on how Americans acquire the civic skills that contribute to their
political effectiveness suggests that its link to religious congregations may give faith-based
organizing greater democratic import. This is so because religion diffuses in an egalitarian
fashion “democratic skills” such as the ability to write a letter to a political representative, make
a public speech, attend a meeting, or plan and lead a meeting (Verba 1995). Though these are
essential democratic skills, they are not simply natural attributes of citizens; they are learned
abilities and inclinations. Verba and colleagues studied the three kinds of “pre-political settings”
in which people in American society typically learn these skills: the workplace, non-political
voluntary organizations, and religious organizations. The first two offer the most abundant
learning opportunities, but those opportunities are badly skewed in favor of those who already
enjoy the most socio-economic advantages: men rather than women; those with the highest
salaries, most education, and family wealth rather than those with less of these; and whites rather
than African Americans and Hispanics. Only religious organizations offer opportunities for
democratic skills-acquisition in egalitarian ways: to women as much as to men; to the socioeconomically disadvantaged as much as to the well off; and to African Americans even more
than to white Americans.12 Faith-based organizing thus taps into a rare institutional arena in
which poor, working, and lower middle class families are on relatively equal democratic footing
with upper middle class and wealthy families.13
Second, recent work by political sociologists, (Casanova 1994; Wald 1987), political
scientists (Leege and Kellstedt 1993), and practitioners (Coleman 1991; Reed 1996) has
demonstrated that religion has not in any simple sense succumbed to pressures toward
privatization. Rather, religion in the U.S. and elsewhere has maintained a vital public presence
around a variety of issues and in diverse political settings. Faith-based community organizing
represents another facet of this public face of religion, but with a twist: Rather than concentrating
on the issues of individual morality that have provided the focus of much public religion in the
United States in recent years, faith-based organizing focuses on building greater democratic
participation and social justice explicitly tied to the economic self-interest and quality of life of
those on the lower end of the economic spectrum of American and British society – in keeping
with important themes in Catholic, historic black Protestant, and mainline Protestant theology
and social teaching. If one accepts, following much democratic thinking from the founding
fathers of the United States down to the present, that strong economic polarization contradicts
democratic ideals and undermines democratic practice, then this public face of religion in favor
of economic justice carries important pro-democratic implications.
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Third, scholars of grassroots political culture in the United States have documented the
central role of cultural dynamics within social institutions, democratic organizations and civil
society (Bellah 1985; Bellah 1991; Demerath and Williams 1992; Lichterman 1996; Eliasoph
1998; Williams 1999a; Williams 1999b). More specifically, Stephen Hart (2001) argues that
conservative political movements have been much more adept than liberal/progressive
movements at doing the “cultural work” to link their priorities to the religious traditions that
shape Americans’ moral commitments – despite the fact that, as Hart argues, the religious
traditions of American life have at least as many resources for supporting progressive political
positions as for supporting more conservative ones. Those most committed to the economic wellbeing of working people have simply failed to do the cultural work to link their agendas to the
moral-religious currents flowing in American history. Hart cites faith-based organizing as the
best example of progressive organizations doing this cultural work relatively successfully, albeit
with important limitations.
Likewise, Wood (1999) examines how the cultural dynamics within democratic
movements strengthen or undermine their political outcomes. He argues that – at least within
relatively democratic political regimes – those outcomes are strongly conditioned by the
organizations’ ability to simultaneously (1) contest dominant political power, and (2) enter into
compromise with political elites. Wood analyzes the efforts of faith-based organizing and other
democratic movements to balance these contrasting cultural demands of democratic politics.
Simultaneously sustaining both cultural challenges of contestation and compromise represents a
difficult task; religious traditions represent one source of the cultural resources and complex
worldviews necessary for meeting these challenges. Faith-based organizing has institutionalized
the organizational relations between congregations and its own federations in a kind of
“structural symbiosis” (Wood 2001) that helps it meet both challenges. In other words, from its
relationship with congregations, faith-based organizing draws the complex cultural resources
that allow it to make simultaneous sense of both conflict and compromise in its political work; in
turn, when done well faith-based organizing gives back to those congregations leaders with
better-developed skills and a deeper understanding of the public dimensions of religious faith.
Thus, when Father Joseph Justice of Santa Ana, California said in an interview that organizing
had benefitted his parish, and was whether he would work with faith-based organizing in the
future, he noted:
I [would] look for certain things. Are the organizers coming in with an agenda or
are they looking for what are the needs? PICO certainly was looking for what are
the needs here. And they have fulfilled what they said they would do, which is
build relationships and develop lay leaders.
Fourth, faith-based organizing may provide some antidote to a key weakness in civil
society in the United States in recent decades: the erosion of American society’s store of “social
capital” (Warren 2001; Wood forthcoming). Social capital refers to the quantity and quality of
ties between individuals, through both personal networks and voluntary associations. Though the
concept of social capital continues to be hotly debated, most observers agree that strong social
capital allows people to work together more efficiently (for both positive and negative goals).
Historically, American society has been particularly rich in social capital, which has provided
the basis for political movements and voluntaristic efforts to ameliorate various kinds of social
problems. But Robert Putnam (Putnam 2000) has amassed impressive evidence documenting a
significant decline in American social capital over the last four decades; he argues that this
erosion of social capital bodes poorly for the future of American democratic life.
Understanding how faith-based organizing may provide an antidote to this erosion
requires making a distinction between two kinds of social glue holding people together in society
“bonding” and “bridging” social capital (Gittell 1998; Putnam 2000, p. 24). Bonding social
capital links people within communities together, fostering social trust and cohesion among
people within a neighborhood, town, religious congregation, racial or ethnic group, etc. Bridging
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social capital links people across these kinds of communities, fostering social trust and cohesion
between people and groups on opposite sides of social divides (black and white; Hispanic and
African American and Southeast Asian; Protestant, Catholic, Jew, and Muslim; rival gangs in
adjacent neighborhoods, etc.). Religion has been an important source of bonding social capital
throughout American history but, like other sources of social capital, has not functioned as
effectively in building bridging social capital – thus, the common adage that “the most
segregated hour in America is Sunday morning.” But faith-based organizing in many locations
draws people from differing faith traditions, ethnic groups, and economic classes into shared
efforts at political change – into social solidarity built upon shared democratic endeavor. In this
way, it may provide an important source of bridging social capital and (to the extent it helps
generate more vibrant religious congregations) it may contribute to rebuilding the store of
bonding social capital in low- and middle-income American urban communities.
Fifth, faith-based organizing may compensate for a key structural weakness in American
political institutions that appears to have worsened in recent years. Healthy democratic life
depends upon the flourishing of what scholars call a “public realm” or “public sphere.” The
public realm is made up of those settings in which people come together and talk about their
common future, the problems facing society, and alternative solutions to those problems (Dewey
1954; Arendt 1958; Arendt 1972; Habermas 1989; Benhabib 1991). The public realm can be
seen as overlaying three levels of society: (1) Government settings in which officials engage in
discerning “public talk”; (2) settings of “political society” – that is, associations linked to but not
part of government, such as political parties, the media, labor unions, and employers or
professional associations when they transcend narrow self-interest; and (3) settings of “civil
society” where people come together for a myriad of purposes beyond the control of government
or corporate elites (Stepan 1988; Casanova 1994). Democracy can thrive where both (1) spaces
exist for public deliberation at all these levels; and (2) institutions exist to connect public
deliberation in civil society with that occurring in political society and government. That is,
thriving democracy depends upon institutions providing “upward linkages” within the public
realm, from grassroots civil society to more elite social sectors. One diagnosis of the ills of
contemporary American democracy suggests that, whereas political parties, labor unions, and
other associations once provided such linkages, the various levels of the public realm have
become fractured from one another: Few connections exist between civil society, political
society, and government, and those that do exist are primarily used by political and economic
elites to project influence downward. Little pressure for accountability flows upward from civil
society (see Wood forthcoming, drawing on Cohen 1992; Aldrich 1995; Coleman 1996;
Wattenberg 1998).
If one accepts this diagnosis, faith-based organizing becomes particularly important as an
example of a “bridging institution” projecting democratic power from civil society upward into
the “political”and “government” levels of the public realm.14 To the extent it does so
successfully and democratically – to the extent it “holds officials accountable” to real democratic
needs – it compensates for the erosion of other political institutions that once served this
function. It may also provide some model for how democratic activists can begin to build greater
accountability into the modern political process more broadly.
Finally (sixth), recent studies of social movements have shown the crucial role of
sophisticated and creative political strategy in determining whether such movements succeed or
fail (Tarrow 1992; Ganz 2000a; Ganz 2000b). Numerous recent works describe the politically
creative issue work, alliances, and strategies pursued by various sectors of the faith-based
organizing movement, including the previously-cited work on the PICO California Project and
the Texas IAF Network, Gamaliel in the Midwest (Kleidman forthcoming), and independent
organizing in African American churches in Boston (McRoberts 2000). Interfaith Funders (2000)
provides a more movement-wide description of strategic initiatives in this field.
Thus, faith-based community organizing offers inspiration and insight to those interested
in the struggle for social justice in the contemporary world. This is true in part due to its scale: as
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one of the largest and most broad-based movements for social justice in American life, it projects
democratic influence in most large American cities, many congressional districts, and several
politically-crucial states. But it is also true for analytic reasons: faith-based organizing provides
one model for how democratic movements can meet some of the fundamental challenges to
American democracy that analysts have identified: the widening income gaps between different
sectors of American society, plus challenges regarding civic skills acquisition, the public face of
religion, cultural dilemmas of progressive activists and democratic organizations, the erosion of
social capital in American society, structural dilemmas of U.S. political institutions, and the
challenge of strategic innovation for democratic movements.
Caveat:
In recognizing these strengths of faith-based community organizing, it is important to
note that the field has significant shortcomings as well. Some are rooted in its own history and
culture as a movement: The potential political influence of the field is undermined by the
inability of the various networks to work together (albeit for reasons rooted in negative
experiences in the past); these organizations have historically been loathe to collaborate with
other democratic efforts (though this has changed in recent years in some parts of the country);
some organizers are seen as condescending toward those outside their own organizations; and
power and decision-making inside some faith-based organizations can be opaque and lacking in
internal accountability.
Other shortcomings are rooted in constraints imposed by current American economic and
political arrangements: Though better than in many social justice sectors, funding for faith-based
organizing is rarely adequate; although it offers professional wages, the field has perennial
difficulty attracting sufficient numbers of the multi-talented and dynamic people needed for
long-term organizing success; and even the strongest statewide organizing efforts cannot begin
to project sufficient power to affect the vast flows of financial capital that determine the life
chances of working families in the global economy. Yet, at the margins of those vast flows of
global capital, faith-based organizing offers a tool for promoting democratic engagement and
improving the quality of life of working families in ways that matter – and matter profoundly for
those living without good jobs, health insurance, decent housing, excellent schools, or clean air
and water.
The Role of Religion in the Struggle for Justice:
What, then, do we know regarding the contribution of religion to struggles for social
justice? On one hand, religion can help provide some of the things every social movement needs:
people to help lead the movement; material resources such as money, phones, meeting space,
etc.; and social capital and organizational structures that facilitate mobilization. Religion
represents one among many possible sources for all these. More specific to religion are other
factors: complex cultural resources that can simultaneously undergird both contestation and
compromise; symbols, images, and stories that motivate and provide meaning for the struggle
(the Exodus story, the Jewish social prophets, Jesus’ confrontations with irresponsible authority,
the Jewish mystical tradition of “repairing the world,” Islamic understandings of the just
community, etc.); legitimacy in the eyes of the wider society; a sense of primary community
separate from the struggle that unburdens the organization from needing to provide primary
social support for participants. Religion, at least under some circumstances, may be especially
adept at providing these.
But Bellah’s classic statement (Bellah 1970) suggests perhaps the most fundamental
contribution of religion to struggles for social justice. He argues that religion, in fostering the
spiritual dimension of human life, pulls people out of their embeddedness in the status quo of
society, allows them to gain critical distance from it, and helps them to imagine alternatives to
current social arrangements. In so doing, religion provides ethical leverage against the taken-forgrantedness that leads people to accept unjust social situations.
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Conclusion: Religion and Social Justice:
Although a hundred years ago it appeared to some observers (Lenin 1929; Gramsci 1968,
1975) that the struggle for economic justice in the world would be led by vanguard political
parties representing the interests of workers – in isolation from religion and perhaps against the
opposition of religious institutions – there can be little doubt today that such a vision was always
an illusion. People of faith are deeply engaged in the struggle for justice in societies around the
world, very often (though by no means always) with the official support of their religious leaders
and institutions. One model for such engagement, faith-based community organizing in the
United States, has provided the focus of attention for this chapter, due to its scale, political
efficacy, and organizational symbiosis with congregation-based forms of religion. But whether
one looks to Protestants, Catholics, and Jews engaged in faith-based organizing in working-class
neighborhoods of the U.S., secular labor leaders reaching out for support from diverse religious
congregations throughout the Anglophone world, Hindu untouchables organizing politically in
India, liberationist Catholics or reform-minded Pentecostals fighting inequality in Latin America,
anti-corruption community leaders shaped by the “theology of struggle” in the Philippines, or
toward any of a myriad of other examples, religion remains central to struggles for justice
throughout the world today. Any effort to turn our societies toward greater fairness for working
people – and any scholarly effort to better understand those struggles – must take people’s
religious commitments seriously indeed.
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. Please direct correspondence to Richard L. Wood, Department of Sociology, 1915 Roma NE,
SSCI #1103, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131-1166 or at rlwood@unm.edu
2
. The author attended the action as a researcher/observer and verified the actual attendance
figures through a count of the seating capacity at the Sacramento Community Center Theater
plus a large overflow room filled when chairs ran out at the main venue. The large crowd made it
impossible to calculate a precise ethnic breakdown of attendees; the figures cited below are
approximations done by the author by counting the “apparent ethnicity” of those seated in a
representative set of floor sectors.
3
. The key research groups on which PICO leadership relied for their healthcare campaign were
the Health Insurance Policy Program, based out of the Center for Health and Public Policy
Studies at UC-Berkeley and the Center for Health Policy Research at UCLA; and the Insure the
Uninsured Project based in Santa Monica, California. The data quoted in this political event
came from “The State of Health Insurance in California, 1999" report by the UCB/UCLA group
(Schauffler and Brown 2000).
4
. The closing lines from Amos also, of course, evoke the American civil rights movement and
the legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., who used them frequently in his work – most
memorably in his “I have a dream” speech at the March on Washington in 1963.
5
. The best original sources are Alinsky’s own statements, Rules for Radicals (1971) and Reveille
for Radicals (1969). For an excellent brief analysis of how this contemporary strain of radical
democracy has influenced faith-based organizing, see Stephen Hart’s Cultural Dilemmas of
Progressive Politics: Styles of engagement among grassroots activists (University of Chicago
2001).
6
. In its goals and ethos, this model is quite distinct from – and should not be confused with – the
more familiar model of political mobilization adopted by the Christian Right over the last three
decades. See the following accounts of community organizing: Harry Boyte Backyard
Revolutions (1980) and Commonwealth: A Return to Citizen Politics (1989), William Greider
Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American Democracy (1992), and Mary Beth Rogers
Cold Anger: A Story of Faith and Power Relations (1990). Recent scholarly work includes
Stephen Hart, op cit., Mark Warren’s Dry Bones Rattling (Princeton University Press 2001), and
my forthcoming Faith in Action: Religion, Race, and Democratic Organizing in America.
7
. Several factors account for the rather anonymous nature of faith-based organizing: First,
though they indeed make up a coherent field of similar organizations engaged in similar
practices and organized in an organizational field structured by the four networks, the 130 or so
federations go by a diverse set of names so that one might move from one city to another and
never know that the same organizing model is at work. Second, a large portion of the nationallevel publicity has focused on the Industrial Areas Foundation, thus blurring the perception of
the wider field. Third, though the IAF or other groups have been mentioned frequently as
examples of civic engagement (see Evans and Boyte 1986; Boyte 1989; Greider 1992; Lappe
and Dubois 1994), until now relatively little work has focused close analytic attention on faithbased organizing. Fourth, faith-based organizing has largely escaped the attention of national
political observers because until recently none of the networks were capable of operating in
arenas of political power beyond local or county governments; the Texas Industrial Areas
Foundation and the PICO California Project are the clearest examples to date of this new
capability, but parallel efforts are underway in other states in all four networks.
8
. These and the following data are from a forthcoming study sponsored by Interfaith Funders
and the Catholic Campaign for Human Development, the first important study to gather data on
the entire field of faith-based community organizing (Warren and Wood 2001). All figures listed
are approximations, projected as follows: The study managed to locate and interview the
directors of three-quarters of the organizing federations around the country that we could
identify (network-affiliated or independent, with the criteria for inclusion being that they had to
practice a form of organizing recognizable as faith-based community organizing and had to have
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an office and at least one full-time staff member on the payroll at the time of the study). The
numbers given in the text are then calculated from the 100 responding federations, projected to
reflect the full universe of 133 federations nationwide, with the projection weighted by network
to reflect differential participation. Numbers are rounded off, in order to reflect the projected
nature of the data and methodological uncertainties.
9
. The largest and most widely publicized of the networks is the Industrial Areas Foundation
(IAF); indeed, in the minds of casual observers faith-based organizing is often synonymous with
the IAF, but in fact it incorporates a little more than a third of the more than 133 identified
organizations. About 40% of the organizations are affiliated with the Pacific Institute for
Community Organization or the Gamaliel Network (about a fifth of organizations each). Direct
Action, Research, and Training (DART) represents about a tenth of identified federations. The
remaining faith-based organizing efforts, a little more than a tenth of the total, are independent
federations or members of smaller networks (Regional Council of Neighborhood Organizations;
Organizing, Leadership, and Training Center; Inter-Valley Project, etc.).
10
. As of this writing (May 2001), these healthcare gains in California are at risk of being lost,
due to the budget difficulties resulting from California’s vast financial costs in meeting its
energy needs in a deregulated utilities market.
11
. Christians Supporting Community Organizing, an organization based in Boulder, Colorado, is
dedicated to trying to increase the involvement of evangelical, Pentecostal, and “Holiness”
Christians in the work of faith-based organizing. They have done extensive training with
congregations in these traditions, drawing on scriptural, theological, and ethical sources.
12
. Latinos do have fewer opportunities at democratic skills acquisition, apparently not due to
systematic discrimination in churches but because they are disproportionately Catholic. Despite
advances in lay participation and authority in recent years, Catholic Churches have apparently
not, on average, caught up with Protestant Churches in opportunities for such skills acquisition.
13
. This is not to suggest that religious congregations are in any sense fully egalitarian. They are
not, in part because some grant implicit or explicit privileges to economic wealth and social
status. The point here is that religious congregations are, on average, relatively more egalitarian
than voluntary organizations or the workplace – at least in terms of offering opportunities for
acquiring the civic skills examined by Verba, et al.
14
. Despite the similarity of terminology, “bridging institutions” and “bridging social capital”
refer to quite different phenomena. The latter refers to network ties between individuals in
different social groups. The former refers to an organization-level phenomenon – that is, the
existence of organizations and institutions that bridge the gaps across different vertical levels of
the public realm, thus linking them into a more coherent and communicative whole.

